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ST. JOHN'S
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME XII APRIL, 1938 NUMBER 2
STATUTORY LIMITATIONS ON CHARITABLE
BEQUEST OR DEVISE
F IDUCIAiS administering estates under wills containing
charitable bequests or devises have frequently experienced
difficulty in the matter of distribution. Counsel is aware of
the statutory limitation on such bequests or devises but is
often confused in attempting to apply the statute. Reference
to some of the cases construing the statute has only served to
increase his doubt as to what the fiduciary may properly pay
to charity.
The original statute limiting bequests and devises was
enacted in 1860, Chapter 360, Section 1, and provided as
follows:
"No person having a husband, wife, child or
parent shall by his or her last Will and Testament
devise or bequeath to any benevolent, charitable, lit-
erary, scientific, religious or missionary society, asso-
ciation oi corporation, in trust or otherwise, more
than one-half part of his or her estate, after the pay-
ment of his or her debts (and such devise or bequest
shall be valid to the extent of one-half, and no more)."
The statute was subsequently amended in the following
respects:
The law was consolidated into Section 17 of the
Decedent Estate Law' and the above .parentheses
removed.
'Added by Laws of 1909, c. 18.
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The words "or purposes" were added to the title,
and inserted after the word "corporation" and before
the words "in trust" in the body of the law, thereby
increasing the class that may receive such bequests.2
A further amendment 3 resulted in including
descendants of the testator by adding the words "or
descendant" after the word "child" and before the
words "or parent." Thus the right to oppose such
bequests was extended to the issue of the testator.
So the statute remained until amended in 1929 and 1936,
which amendments shall later be considered.
In determining whether or not the will violated the
statute where such bequests were contested, the gross estate,
less debts, established the basis for computation of the char-
itable interest. Of this amount charity was entitled to only
one-half. If the amount that charity was to receive exceeded
such one-half of the estate at death the statute had been vio-
lated and the question as to disposal of the excess property
was before the fiduciary.
A voidable bequest may arise through (1) giving the
charitable general legatees more than the permissive half,
or (2) by bequeathing or devising more to charity as a
residuary legatee than it is entitled to, or (3) by giving it
a remainder interest in a residuary trust.
VOIDABLE GENERAL BEQUEST OR DEVISE.
In the first case assume the assets at death equal
$25,000.00 and that the debts amount to $1,000.00. The bal-
ance is $24,000.00, one-half of which is $12,000.00. The ad-
ministration expenses equal $2,000.00. Looking at the will
we find bequests of $10,000.00 to charity A, $5,000.00 to
charity B, and the residuary estate to the widow, C. If the
widow contests the bequests to charities all that they may
receive is 12,000.00. (Charity A, $8,000.00 and charity B,
'Added by Laws of 1923, c. 301.
' Added by Laws of 1927, c. 502.
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$4,000.00.) The distribution of the estate on the above basis
would be as follows:
Gross assets .................................................................. $25,000.00
Less debts .................................................... $1,000.00
Administration expenses .......................... 2,000.00 3,000.00
Net distributable estate ...................................... $22,000.00
Charitable bequest (A & B) reduced to .................. 12,000.00
Residue to 0, widow .................................................... $10,000.00
Had the above will been executed after August 31, 1930,
the widow would have been entitled to one-half the distribu-
table estate $11,000.00, if she had possessed and asserted her
right of election under Section 18 of the Decedent Estate
Law and if the decedent was not survived by issue. If there
were issue surviving the testator the elective share of the
widow would be $7,333.33 (1/3 of $22,000.00, the net distribu-
table estate) under Section 18 but, as she would be entitled
to take $10,000.00 under Section 17, it would be to her in-
terest to contest the bequest under the latter section.
VOIDABLH RESIDUARY BEQUEST OR DEvIsE.
Under the second case where the void bequest to charity
arises under the residuary clause of the will assume testator
A executed his will prior to September 1, 1930, under which
he gave his *ife B a legacy of $10,000.00, and the residuary
estate to charities C and D in equal shares. He died October
5, 1935, and the executor's account as of January 3, 1937,
reveals the following summary statement:
CRARGES:
Schedule A (Inventory-Testator owned no
real property) ................................................ $212,000.00
Schedule A-1 (Increases) ................................ 13,000.00
Schedule A-2 (Income) .................................... 7,500.00
Total accounted for .................................. $232,500.00
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CREDITS:
Schedule B (Losses) ...................... $7,000.00
Schedule C (Funeral and admin-
istration expenses) ...................... 8,500.00
Schedule E (Debts) ........................ 2,000.00
Total credits ............................................... 17,500.00
BALANCE ON HAND .................................................. $215,000.00
Subject to commissions and costs of .............. 15,000.00
Nur DISTRIBUTABLE ESTATE .................................... $200,000.00
The widow wishes to avail herself of any interest she
may have under the statute. The charitable maximum in-
terest is $105,000.00 (gross assets $212,000.00, less debts of
$2,000.00, equals $210,000.00).
Thus B, the wife, takes as a legatee, $10,000.00; C and
D, $105,000.00, leaving excess property in the hands of the
executor amounting to $85,000.00, which must be disposed
of under Section 83 of the Decedent Estate Law, as in
intestacy.4
Surviving the decedent were his widow B and a niece E,
the sole issue of a predeceased sister. This intestate property
would be distributed as follows:
To B $10,000.00, plus one-half of the balance, or
$37,500.00; total to B under intestacy, $47,500.00; E would
be entitled to receive $37,500.00 as her share in intestacy.
Had the will in the above illustration been executed sub-
sequent to August 31, 1930, and had the wife possessed and
asserted her right of election under Section 18, instead of
contesting the validity of the charitable bequest under Sec-
tion 17, distribution of the estate would be altered consid-
erably. One-half of the net distributable estate, which the
wife would be entitled to, is $100,000.00; charities' permissive
one-half is $105,000.00, but after the widow has withdrawn
her elective share, there remains only $100,000.00, which is
'Matter of Logasa, 163 Misc. 628, 247 N. Y. Supp. 730 (1937).
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all the charitable legatees may take. Obviously, the niece
would receive nothing here as there would be no remaining
intestate property.
VOIDABLE RFmAINDER INTEREST.
In the last case, where the charity is a remainderman
of a trust, the estate is to be considered as though it had
been converted into money as of the testator's death. The
share of the legatees, both general and residuary, are like-
wise considered. In order to determine the residuary estate
to be placed in trust all debts, administration expenses,
legacies, and preliminary trusts are added together and the
total is deducted from the gross assets, giving the residuary
estate as of death. The present value of the life tenant's in-
terest in the residuary estate is then calculated by reference
to the mortality tables, contained in the Rules of Civil Prac-
tice." The present value of the life tenant's interest deducted
from the corpus of the residuary trust fund gives the interest
of the charitable remainderman as of the testator's death.
If the charity's remainder interest together with the other
bequests to charity under the will are less than one-half of
the gross estate less debts at death, the will is valid and
charity is entitled to the whole gift under the will when pay-
able on termination of the trust estate. If the charity's re-
mainder interest exceeds one-half of the gross estate less
debts there is a violation of the statute and payments under
the will are accordingly modified. However, under the
Matter of Seymour 6 where the bequest to charity exceeded
the permissive one-half, the charity remainderman's interest
was considered a general legacy for the maximum of a fixed
amount at death which is equal to the maximum allowable
under the statute. The interest of charity being thus deter-
mined it acquired the advantages of any other general legatee,
namely, the right to interest on its legacy. In Matter of
Seymour,7 supra, interest was figured at the rate of five per
cent, compounded annually, until the time of payment. The
'Matter of Apple, 141 Misc. 380, 252 N. Y. Supp. 580 (1931).
'Matter of Seymour, 239 N. Y. 372, 146 N. E. 372 (1925).
7Ibid.
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accumulation of this fixed charge in the form of compound
interest on the legacy could result in a greater sum being
paid to charity eventually than equalled one-half of the gross
estate less debts. As the actually collected income on the
fund was paid to the life tenant of the trust this additional
charge of interest could come from no other source than the
capital which otherwise would have been intestate property.
It would not be at all unlikely that charity might take the
entire fund on the termination of the life estate. If the
actual life of the beneficiary of the trust exceeded his ex-
pectancy, the compounded interest, which could be paid only
from the capital, would in some instances reduce or consume
the entire fund. A fund at five per cent, compounded annu-
ally, doubles itself in fourteen years. Where a life tenant
lived for this period or greater, the non-charity interests
would certainly receive nothing due to the fact that while
charity was waiting, interest charges were accruing.
Analysis of the figures in Matter of Schalkenbach,8 will
serve to demonstrate the method employed to determine
whether charity received more than one-half the estate and if
the will violated the statute.
Gross assets (Real and personal at death,
N ovem ber, 1924) ....................................................
Administration expenses ...................... $32,531.95
Taxes ...................................................... 10,008.85
D ebts ...................................................... 21,885.17
Distributable estate at death ..........................
Legacies and quarantine ...................... $93,994.00
Capital of trusts established by will,
of which charity was the remain-
derm an ............................................... 225,000.00
Residuary estate to Robert Schalkenbach
Foundation as of testator's death ..............
$457,129.60
64,425.97
$392,703.63
318,994.00
$ 73,709.63
'Matter of Schalkenbach, 155 Misc. 332, 279 N. Y. Supp. 181 (1935).
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The following computation determines the permissive
half to charity:
G ross estate ................................................................
D ebts ..........................................................................
Gross estate less debts ......................................
Permissive one-half to charity ................................
Charity bequests under will:
General legacies to charity ..................................
Charity remainder interest under trust estab-
lished in will (*225,000.00 less present value
of intervening life estates and receiving
commissions of trustee, $89,475.00) ..............
Residuary charity legatee ...................................
Total bequest to charity ..................................
Which amount is less than one-half the estate ....
by ...... ....................... ....................
457,129.60
21,885.17
$435,244.43
$217,622.22
7,000.00
135,525.00
73,709.63
$216,234.63
217,622.22
$ 1,387.59
Thus it may be seen that, considering everything as of
the time of the testator's death, the bequests to charity did
not exceed the permissive half of the gross estate less debts
and the charities thus became entitled to every bequest and
devise given under the will. The mere fact that charities
may take eventually the full corpus of the trust amounting
to 225,000.00, $73,709.63 as a residuary legatee, and $7,000.00
as a general legatee, which sums total 305,709.63, results in
no violation of the statute as charity received less than one-
half of the gross estate less debts as of the date of death.
The difference between the value as of the time of distribu-
tion and the time of death is the discount during the life ex-
pectancy of the life tenants. No computation of interest is
involved in this illustration since the bequests to charity as
of the testator's death was less than one-half of the gross
estate less debts.
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WHO MAY CONTEST THE BEQUEST OR DEVISE.
Under the law as it existed prior to 1930 those entitled
to share in the estate because of a voidable bequest to charity
were permitted to challenge the provisions of the will on this
account, although the closest distributees, the wife, brothers
and sisters, were entirely satisfied with the testamentary
scheme of distribution. Thus, a niece, the issue of a pre-
deceased sister, had the right to contest the charitable be-
quest and thereby take advantage of the statute. If she were
successful all other distributees could likewise profit.
RECOMMENDATIONS OF COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE DEFECTS
OF THE LAWS OF ESTATES.
As has been shown, a situation existed prior to 1930 by
which there was a limitation of one-half payable to charity.
Due to the allowance of interest on this half, where the estate
was in trust and charity forced to await its payment, the en-
tire corpus of the estate might be consumed in paying char-
ity what it was entitled to receive, reducing the share of the
distributees to zero., It has been shown also that remote
relatives were in a position to frustrate the testator's wishes
though close relatives had no such desires and were agreeable
to stand by the provisions of the will."
To overcome the reduction through interest charges on
the distributees' interest in the estate, and to limit attacks
on charitable bequests, the statute was amended as a result
of the study and recommendations of the Commission to In-
vestigate Defects of the Laws of Estates. Section 17 of the
Decedent Estate Law, as amended by Chapter 229 of the
Laws of 1929, Section 3, effective September 1, 1930, inserted
the following italicized text:
DEVISE OR BEQUEST TO CERTAIN SOCIETIES, Asso-
CIATIONS, CORPORATIONS OR PURPOSES. "No person hav-
ing a husband, wife, child or descendant or parent,
shall by his or her last will and testament, devise or
'Matter of Mosley, 138 Misc. 847, 247 N. Y. Supp. 520 (1930).
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bequeath to any benevolent, charitable, literary, sci-
entific, religious or missionary society, association,
corporation or purpose, in trust or otherwise, more
than one-half part of his or her estate, after the pay-
ment of his or her debts, and such devise or bequest
shall be valid to the extent of one-half, and no more.
The validity of a devise or bequest for more than such
one-half may be contested only by a surviving husband,
wife, child, descendant or parent. When payment of
a devise or bequest to such society, association, corpo-
ration or purpose is postponed, in computing the one-
half part of such society, association, corporation or
purpose, no allowance may be made for such postpone-
ment or for any interest or gains which may accrue
after the testator's death."
CONTESTS REDUCED.
The first result of this amendment is to confine the right
to contest excess of charitable bequests to the preferred class
of distributees mentioned in the amendment. If they are sat-
isfied with the will, it stands as written by the testator. It
should be noted that despite the amendment if the spouse
(there being no descendant or parent) should contest the be-
quest it might still result that some of the property undis-
posed of could pass to distributees who under existing law
had no right to contest the bequest in the first instance.10
In the illustration heretofore given of a voidable bequest to
charity arising under the residuary clause of the will, the
niece of the testator could take a substantial part of the es-
tate due to the opposition by the wife. Had there been no
opposition by the wife, the niece could not share. Thus one
of the preferred distributees might increase her interest in
the assets of the estate through the contest and at the same
time create an interest for another distributee who could do
nothing in her own behalf to share in the intestate property.
Though the right to make such contests has been reduced to
the preferred distributees there is no limitation on the dis-
"o Matter of Sonderling, 157 Misc. 231, 283 N. Y. Supp. 568 (1935).
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tribution of intestate property arising from the contest; it
passes as ordinary intestate property.
INTEREST ON BEQUEST On DEVISE ELIMINATED.
The remainder of the amendment has to do with the
elimination of interest on the deferred charitable remainder
interest and with gains accruing subsequent to the testator's
death."
Doubt as to the effect of this part of the amendment
seems to have arisen in the minds of some Surrogates before
whom questions affecting charitable remainder interests were
presented. In Matter of Miranda,12 the husband of the tes-
tatrix questioned the validity of a bequest to charity. The
gross estate was $13,550.08 of which $447.31 represented an
equity in real property. Debts equaled $1,334.49, giving a
gross estate, less debts at death of $12,215.59, one-half of
which was $6,107.79. The will provided for the payment of
$300.00 to a cemetery for perpetual care of the grave. This
was held to be a non-charitable gift. Four articles were
specifically bequeathed to the Brooklyn Museum if it "de-
sired to receive them." The balance of the estate was placed
in trust for the benefit of the tiusband and a sister and their
U Note of Decedent's Estate Commission (1929) to § 17 D. E. L. It is
proposed that only those whose survivorship furnishes the ground for an
objection to the will shall have the right to object. Also supersedes the ruling
in Matter of Seymour, 239 N. Y. 259, 146 N. E. 372 (1925), that interest shall
be added when payment is postponed, and declares the rule in that case that
gains shall not be added. The amendment is in accord with the legislative
intent that only one-half shall be paid over, and no more. The authorities hold
that the computation of the one-half payable to the charitable or other corpora-
tions named must be computed as of the death of the decedent and upon the
same basis as if it had then been turned into cash. By the amendment the
Commission seeks to continue this rule as to the time of computation but
intends to avoid any allowance to the charity by reason of a postponement
occasioned by the terms of the will. The statute, it has been held, transforms
a residuary gift to the corporation uncertain in amount into a general legacy
for a fixed sum. Where a precedent trust has existed, and the income has been
applied to the use of the beneficiary, a postponement of payment to the corpora-
tion would result under the decision cited, in a charge against the persons, who
would be entitled to the other half, of the amount of interest on the postponed
legacy to the corporation; interest was allowed under that decision at five per
cent, compounded annually. A continuance of the trust for a substantial period
of years might largely cut down the one-half share to such other persons,
against whom would also be charged any losses incurred during the interim.
1 Matter of Miranda, 151 Misc. 429, 271 N. Y. Supp. 913 (1934).
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survivor, with remainder over to the Methodist Episcopal
Hospital. At the testatrix's death the younger of the life
tenants was sixty years of age. The value of the life estates
was found to be $,,600.26, which sum the Surrogate deducted
from the gross estate at death, less debts, leaving $7,615.33.
(It may be noted that the 300.00 legacy to the cemetery and
the administration expenses have not been considered in this
computation. If these items were considered the residuary
trust would accordingly be reduced and the charitable re-
mainder interest decreased). One-half of the estate at death
was $6,107.79 and as the Surrogate determined the amount
of the charity's remainder interest to be $7,615.33 the will
violated the statute. The Surrogate determined that the
maximum gift to charity was $6,107.79 and that the balance
of the fund was intestate property passing to the husband.
WHAT SHOULD ONE-HALF op ESTATE BE?
A maximum of fifty per cent of the gross estate at death
less debts was allowable to charity but charity was forced
to await the payment until the trust terminated. Naturally,
the one-half at death could not be the same as one-half of
the estate when ultimately paid on the termination of the
trust. One dollar in hand is worth more than one dollar
payable ten years from now.
In the Matter of Sonderling,13 the same question was
before another Surrogate. There the gross estate at death
less debts, was $517,139.72, the permissive half being
*258,569.86. The value of the life estates based upon the
mortality tables was $132,772.72. This the Surrogate de-
ducted from the gross estate, less debts, as was done in
Matter of Miranda,14 supra, leaving a balance of 384,367.00
as the interest of charity. This amount exceeded the per-
missive one-half. The Surrogate held that the gift to charity
became a gift of $258,569.86. There had been a gain during
the administration of the estate which the Surrogate directed
to be retained in the trust until its termination. The Surro-
2'Matter of Sonderling, 155 Misc. 403, 279 N. Y. Supp. 703 (1935).
" Matter of Miranda, 151 Misc. 429, 271 9 . Y. Supp. 913 (1934).
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gate also intimated in the opinion that it was futile to antici-
pate gains or losses, stating that depletion to a great extent
may occur and thereby eliminate the distributees from shar-
ing in the intestate property.
In the Sonderling 15 case under consideration, in deter-
mining the amount of property distributable as in intestacy
the Surrogate seems to have deducted the one-half which
charity might take eventually from the value of the gross
estate at death less debts rather than from the value of the
remainder interest.
EXCESS OVER ONE-HALF ONLY VOIDABLE.
In Matter of, Apple,"6 problems regarding charitable be-
quests and the right of election of a surviving spouse were
presented to the Court on a construction proceeding. The
gross estate at death less debts was $24,796.96, one-half being
$12,398.48. As a result of the exercise by the husband of a
limited right of election he withdrew $2,500.00 from the trust
fund under Section 18 of the Decedent Estate Law leaving
$22,296.96 in the principal account.
Under the will the husband was given a legal life estate
in the estate. Upon his death $4,000.00 was payable from
the fund to certain individuals and the balance to several
charities in equal parts.
Reference was made to the mortality tables to deter-
mine the value of the husband's expectancy. This value was
fixed at $5,421.28, which together with his outright payment
under Section 18, Decedent Estate Law, equaled $7,921.28.
The other non-charitable beneficiaries were the remainder-
men of a $4,000.00 fund which had a present value of
$3,028.00 (being diminished by the life use of the husband).
The total bequests to non-charities, therefore, amounted to
$10,949.28. The gross estate at death less debts was
$24,796.96 which, when non-charitable bequests were deduct-
ed, left bequests to charity of $13,847.68. The permissive
one-half is $12,398.48. The bequest to charity exceeded this
' Matter of Sonderling, 155 Misc. 403, 279 N. Y. Supp. 703 (1935).
'8 Matter of Apple, 141 Misc. 380, 252 N. Y. Supp. 580 (1931).
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amount by $1,449.20, which was held to be intestate property
and payable to the husband as a distributee.
In Matter of Apple,17 unlike Matter of Sonderlig,18
supra, though the bequest to charity exceeded the permissive
half there was no attempt to cut the eventual distribution
down to one-half of the estate finally to be distributed. All
bequests and devises including those to charity were valued
as of death. The above figures indicate that $13,847.68 was
sought to be given to charity as of death. The only voidable
bequest that could arise would be the difference between one-
half of the estate less debts at death and charity's share at
death as determined by the mortality tables, or .1,449.20.
GAINS AND Lossms DURING CONTINUATION OF TRUST.
Consideration should be given to gains and losses in the
administration of a trust. What effect do gains and losses
during the administration of the fund have upon the ulti-
mate distribution?
In the Matter of Buck, 9 these questions were presented
to the court for construction. Examination of this proceed-
ing disclosed the following:
Gross assets at death, October 17, 1933 ................
D ebts ........................................................ $1,221.46
Administration expenses ........................ 7,841.39
Executor's commissions .......................... 3,397.88
$150,784.99
12,460.73
Distributable estate of ...................................... $138,324.26
Subject to specific and general legacies,
as follows:
Specific legacy to charity .............. $ 606.94
General legacies ............................... 7,000.00 7,606.94
Leaving a residuary estate of ............... $130,717.32
Less-trustee commissions ....................................... 2,634.34
Leaving a net trust fund of .................................... $128,082.98
' 141 Misc. 380, 252 N. Y. Supp. 703 (1931).
'8 155 Misc. 403, 279 N. Y. Supp. 703 (1935).
"Matter of Buck, 158 Misc. 111, 114, 285 N. Y. Supp. 515 (1936).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
This trust was administered subject to the following
limitations:
The widow was entitled to an annuity of $4,800.00 per
annum. At the time of the decedent's death, she was sixty-
seven years of age, and the present value of her interest in
this fund was set forth as $35,131.68. Under the will she
was entitled also to call upon the trustee to pay her an addi-
tional $5,000.00 for "extraordinary expenses" not exceeding
$500.00 annually. This right was presently valued at
$3,930.35. She had the further right to appoint $10,000.00
payable out of the trust fund. This right was presently
valued at $6,413.20. Thus, the value of the widow's interest
in and rights over the trust fund amounted to $45,475.23.
The trust fund was .................................................. $128,082.98
Less-Present value of widow's rights .................. 45,475.23
Leaving balance to charity of ................................ $ 82,607.75
Specific legacy to charity ........................................ 606.94i
Total charitable bequests ................................ $ 83,214.69
Maximum charitable bequest:
Gross estate at death ...................... $150,784.99
Less- Debts ..................................... 1,221.46
Balance at death .......................... $149,563.53
One-half is .............................................................. $ 74,781.76
Amount by which bequests to charity exceeded
the permissive one-half ........................................ $ 8,432.93
As the voidable bequest to charity arose through the
residuary clause of the will from a void bequest to charity,
the residuary excess in the bequest was payable to the dis-
tributees upon the termination of the trust. The trust is
valid and no difficulty is experienced until the death of the
life tenant occurs, when the fiduciary is required to pay over
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the corpus. The amount of intestate property as of the date
of death was $8,432.93. The balance of the trust fund,
$119,650.05, was earmarked for charity. What these in-
terests will ultimately amount to at the time of distribution
depends upon gains and losses during the administration of
the trust.
If possible, the intestate property should be earmarked
and separately administered. The income on this earmarked
fund should be paid to the life tenant, together with the in-
come on the balance of the fund which is eventually payable
to charity. Whatever profit or loss results on the earmarked
funds of the estate will increase or decrease the intestate
property payable to the distributees on the termination of the
trust. If it is impossible or impracticable to earmark that
portion of the fund which represents the void bequest or in-
testate portion, then the estate should be administered in
solido. That portion of the fund representing intestate prop-
erty, compared with the entire trust, represents the per-
centage interest of the intestate property in the whole fund.
The ratio or percentage of the intestate property to the whole
of the fund at the time of setting up the trust will be applied
to the fund at distribution, and the amount payable to dis-
tributees will be so ascertained. Thus, increases or losses
during the administration will be prorated to charity and
distributees in the ratio that the interests bear to the total
fund. Equality in distribution is thereby preserved. The
text of the 1929 amendment relating to gains refers to gains
during the executorial period of administration. Whatever
gain or loss occurs after the trust has been established per-
tains proportionately to those who ultimately receive the fund
on distribution.
BASIS OF VALUING LIFE ESTATES.
In cases where life tenants died before the question arose
courts have been urged to use the actual life period rather
than the mortality tables in valuing the life estate and re-
mainder interest of a trust. Thus, if a life tenant was 28
years old when the testator died, the present value of his in-
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terest in the fund, based upon the tables, would equal a figure
which would necessarily validate any bequest to charity of
a remainder interest in the trust. On the other hand, were
such a life tenant to live but one year and should the value
of his life estate be ascertained on the basis of one year's
duration it would result in a determination that the bequest
to charity exceeded o-half of the estate. Were the life ten-
ant an elderly person, charitable beneficiaries would find it
to their interest to seek the determination of values on the
same basis in the hope that the life tenant's actual life would
be longer than the tables foretold and sufficiently long to
validate the bequests to charity of the remainder.
It may readily be seen that great confusion and injustice
might result from the general application of any such rule.
To eliminate uncertainty and have one definite method of
computation based upon expectancy rather than the actual
life of the beneficiary the statute was amended by the Laws
of 1936, Chapter 288, effective April 6, 1936, by adding the
following to the existing statute:
"The value of an annuity or life estate, legal or equi-
table, shall not be computed upon the actual duration
of the life, but shall be computed upon the actuarial
value according to the American Experience Table of
Mortality at the rate of five per centum per annum.
Such value shall be deducted from the fund or prop-
erty, which is subject to the annuity or life estate, in
order to ascertain the value of a future estate or re-
mainder interest passing to such society, association,
corporation or purpose."
The words "or losses" were inserted after the word
"gains" and before the words "which may" so that gains and
losses after death are disregarded.
In Matter of Kaufman °2 0 an attack upon charitable be-
quests was made by the testator's widow. The gross estate
at death less debts was $1,959,983.80, one-half thereof "the
amount which gifts to charity may not validly exceed" being
'Matter of Kaufman, 158 Misc. 102, 285 N. Y. Supp. 515 (1936).
[ VOL. 12
1938 ] LIMITATIONS ON CHARITABLE BEQUEST 209
979,991.90. The payments to the trustees amounted to
1,345,891.68. The Surrogate was urged to compute the life
and remainder interest on a basis of the actual duration of
the life of a life tenant who had died short of his expectancy.
The Surrogate declined to effect computations on this basis
but pointed out incidentally that in the case before him were
such a basis to be adopted the bequest to charity would not
exceed the statutory limit.
Under the 1936 Amendment a final step has been taken
to simplify a most difficult accounting problem. The actual
life of the beneficiary is never to be considered. Mortality
tables are to be considered in all cases involving such
computations.
If the testator wishes to bequeath part of his estate to.
charity it would be well for the lawyer in drawing his will
to be thoroughly familiar with the statutory limitations in
the light of recent decisions. Experience has shown that the
average practitioner is not fully conversant with the provi-
sions of the statute relating to bequests to charity. Care and
thought on the part of the draftsman with regard to be-
quests and devises to charity will result in conservation of
estate assets through reduced litigation. Construction pro-
ceedings to determine the testator's intention and to ascer-
tain whether or not the provisions of the will violate the stat-
ute have delayed the administration of many estates and
caused the fiduciaries much concern and inconvenience.
While it is admitted that hindsight is better than foresight,
especially where surcharges are concerned, there is no reason
why the draftsman may not have the full benefit of hindsight
by a study of the cases construing bequests and devises to
charity.
CHESTBR J. DoDGEo.
New York Law School.
